A way to think labor after nanancialization, decommodifed labor refers to an emptying out of the same wage relation that nonetheless continues to structure our lives. "Working hard or hardly working" needs a new conjunction: in an age of decommodifed labor, one nds oneself working hard and hardly working. I suggest that decommodi ed labor offers cultural critics a form for isolating labor today that takes account of its relation to the wage, that may assist in periodizing the capital-labor relation, and that also highlights nancial change alongside labor's durational necessity under capitalism.
Girls, one character notes to another that he has taken "a new job as an assistant to a curator of dance. It's unpaid, but it could lead somewhere. " Whether in cultural production, cultural consumption or in the content of various cultural texts, decommodi ed labor limns our present. We see further examples of decommodi ed labor in professional sports, civic maintenance, and throughout secondary education and the academy.
As with any "aesthetic-economical-historical"-which is to say, cultural-concept, decommodi ed labor is indexible but not reducible to an empirical reality. We have multiple and discrete data points to guide us. First, there has essentially been no real increase in real wages in the United States since 1970. We know from decades of sociological research that employment has become more service-oriented, low-wage and precarious; the most common job in the United States today is that of cashier. But at another level, bad work becomes no work. Thus we can further qualify not what but whether employment is generated in such a scene. The economic historian Aaron Benanav notes that in "high income countries [by] 2010 more than 1 in 6 workers, and 1 in 4 young workers, counted as surplus to labor demands. " And yet a concept cannot be produced through such data alone; facts must be distilled within a historical scheme in which their importance as fact and the hierarchical terrain in which empiricism might cede into abstraction may be organized and revealed.
To approach the emergence of the changes that render decommodi ed labor visible today is to return to the 1970s. It was then that a coordinated national and international effort led by the United States began to halt wage growth and offer, in its place, ever-expanding forms of ever-cheaper consumer credit. We now have a palate of debt-forms: medical debt, student debt, car debt, mortgages, and credit-card debt. Basic and necessary to social reproduction, often securitized and a now-staple of our nancial system, such debtforms emerge from the ashes of the Keynesian compact. In the United States, that compact insured that organized labor would get more of a share of social wealth in exchange for a less radical labor politics; that the US dollar would serve as the benchmark for international exchange and would be xed to gold. The reasons for its demise are many and, for us, less important: as Keynes himself famously said of economic durability, "in the long run, we are all dead. " In the short run, however, the 1970s would produce shifts in how work was represented, critiqued, and experienced. Union membership began its long decline. The economy began its rst post-war stagnation, now reconceived as "stag ation. " Faced with the fall out from high in ation and high unemployment, Federal
Reserve chairman Paul Volcker foresaw a new path: the Federal Reserve would seek to "break unions and empty factories. " The United States then embraced a nance-led regime whose history is now written in asset bubbles and their denouement: the dot.com bubble, the housing bubble, and as I write in spring, 2018, a new equities bubble seems to be emerging. My concern in this article, however, is with how labor adjusts to such a scheme.
Given this recent history, it is no wonder that scholars have turned to the questions of how to capture conceptually the manner in which people work under such conditions. Immaterial? Redundant? Cognitive? Digital? Affective? We have many terms from which to draw. I will understand work as a local action in which we all engage to make our lives both meaningful and possible, and labor as a coordinated social abstraction through which our work is organized. What I mean to capacitate with the term "decommodi ed labor" is a kind of work that is not compensated through a wage or available through a market purchase. Nor does decommodi ed labor primarily derive from or circulate through the intimate settings of family, care, and love, a kind of work increasingly recognized as In this article, then, I want to make two claims. I want to suggest that decommodi ed labor provides both a terminology and methodology for thinking labor in our current conjuncture. Decommodi ed labor as I present it here seeks to account for increased wagelessness and patterns of economic stagnation after nancialization, even as, once identi ed, it may be located throughout capitalist history. It is a term that articulates a present-ness of labor without making a claim of labor's structural change. Rather, my argument for a decommodi ed labor follows my understanding that there is no new labor in capitalism. Labor has not become more or less affective, more or less material, more or less cognitive. We must see these concepts as moments of attempted periodization that, like periodization based on technological change, are staged at the wrong level of mediation. But labor may be more or less commodi ed, much as the organic composition of capital can and will change. I will argue that sites of labor must be transhistorical within a capitalist frame. A certain type of labor should be able to be located in multiple moments of capitalist history.
I proceed by exploring the history of decommodi cation as a potentially suitable concept for a Marxist political economy; I then suggest that "decommodi ed labor" in particular might help us to clarify how a certain form of labor becomes dominant in an era of real subsumption. Thus, I attempt to draw out a methodology for labor periodization. Finally, I
offer a catalogue of locations where we nd decommodi ed labor today-from the culture industry to academic peer review-as well as related but distinct sites of value extraction and compensation, from prison work to government disability payments, that might help us further delimit decommodi ed labor.
From Decommodifcation to Decommodi ed Labor
The larger concept of decommodi cation has been developed almost exclusively in political science and legal studies where it designates a certain independence from market forces. That independence, on a whole, is understood as a salve from whatever particular injuries an actor, or asset, might face were it to remain in the market. Karl Polanyi introduced the term to limn his famous double movement of capitalism under a process he described as the "embedding" and "disembedding" of market relations. If commodi cation denotes the sale of an object or process on the market, then decommodi cation implies the circumscription of that sale. Polanyi's critique is staged at the level of the social and historical, but we may also see this duality at the scale of the individual.
It was Gösta Epsing-Anderson, however, whose book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism inaugurated the term in its current critical capacity with the claim that "the concept [of decommodi cation] refers to the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable living independent of market participation. " The "three worlds" of welfare capitalism outline the actual degree to which this independence is possible in capitalist democracies. Scandinavian countries circumscribe market forces in the provision of healthcare, education and housing most forcefully, thus their version of decommodi cation offers the most protection to their citizens from the caprices and deprivations of the market. The Anglo-sphere of England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand somewhat circumscribe the commodi cation of these provisions but offer a lesser degree of protection. And the United States permits the highest degree of commodi cation of basic services and thus its social sphere ensures the highest degree of precarity for those living in it. Epsing-Anderson, then, has developed the term as a concept appropriate to understand the freedoms and possibilities of labor within capitalist welfare states. He presents the decommodi cation of labor as the situation in which "a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market. "
Following Epsing-Anderson, Peter Frase has likewise explored the concept, noting its limits. He writes that "so long as the society remains a capitalist one, it is never possible for labor to be totally de-commodi ed, for in that circumstance there would be nothing to compel workers to go take a job working for someone else, and capital accumulation would grind to a halt. " Frase's comment highlights the term's limited scope: one who uses the term, decommodi caiton, is in a sense noting that it in no way seeks to deliver us from a regime of commodi cation; rather, it is a limited response to that regime. Thus while introducing the basic concept of decommodi cation, these theorizations have the additional force of underscoring that commodi cation is the most fundamental physical, social and imaginative infrastructure of our present. Decommodi cation presumes commodi cation it does not presage it.
Decommodi cation, then, carries more modest ambitions than communization precisely because it recognizes the intransigence of commodi cation. But the term's limitations may help to distinguish it from other associated terms such as the practice of "commoning" or the space of "the commons. " Once in a commons, uncompensated labor would no longer be decommodifed-because the scene of commodi cation itself would not exist; there would be no labor but rather, as Marx calls, "really free working. " But there is another worry about the scope of the term "the commons": it carries with it a spatial designation. The commons is (was) a place. Labor claims a duration; "what the worker sells is time, " Harry Braverman reminds us. We would not say that during Occupy Wall Street, Zuccotti Park was decommodi ed; we would say it was commoned. While I note these explorations and uses of the idea of decommodi cation, my term "decommodi ed labor" departs from Epsing-Anderson in some signi cant fashion. Indeed, I invert his usage. For Epsing-Andersen, decommodi cation puts a limit on capitalist organization and its intensi cation as those processes transpire through commodi cation -the selling of an object made by wage labor on a market. In protecting certain forms of social need-housing, medicine, education-from commodity markets, sellers of labor power, i.e., all of us, are a bit more free in the choices we can and must make to socially reproduce ourselves. As I will use the term, however, decommodi ed labor suggests an intensi cation of the possibility of extraction from the labor relation. Such intensi cation happens outside of the wage-labor market because there is no wage. Yet conversely, the process is still within the wage-labor market: we are still witnessing the ability of capital to extract surplus value from a situation of what we recognize as formal labor-going to work, clocking in, having a boss, and so on. With the term decommodi ed labor, I want to suggest a new con guration of value-extraction, in which the wage is adjunct. " In this scheme, recently minted PhDs could apply to work within the university from which they had just graduated; the position was for alumni. Once hired, they would undertake such tasks as graduate advising, committee work, and teaching; the position was part of the University's Graduate Faculty. The positions would span three years, after which renewal would be possible. So one gets credentialed, one applies, one undertakes directed tasks for a bounded time period, one can then apply for renewal to extend that duration. This is a description of formal, highly skilled employment. But, importantly, this position carries no remuneration. Thus, the position is referred to by the university as "zero-time (adjunct) status, " since time and wage are coordinated and here, as the wage is zero, the time becomes zero.
How shall we categorize this type of employment? Is the labor performed in this position cognitive? Absolutely. Is it affective? How could it not be? Just imagine the production of feeling states as one returns to work without pay and shepherds other graduate students into a similarly, if not yet comprehended, unpaid future. Thus there is a subjective element as well: to undertake decommodi ed labor is always to be trained in being a decommodi ed laborer. Is it immaterial? Yes, but it is no doubt material, too. Let us think of the de ning characteristic in this example. Certainly, it is the coincidence of formality and professionalism without remuneration. The labor maintains its commodity form and is exchanged without being sold. This situation renders labor decommodi ed. Let that be our example par excellence as we move forward.
Immediately, in its very terminology, "decommodi ed labor" may appear tautological.
"Labor, " as opposed to work, already is a commodity; labor implies the incorporation of labor-power into capitalism. Why wouldn't "decommodi ed labor" simply be labor power, that with which humans are endowed, before it is sold? Why route labor power through a commodity chain, only to then claim an exception to that chain? The answer to such questions is that with decommodi ed labor the commodity chain is still in place as are the presumptions of wage labor and the infrastructure of associated bene ts and losses, but the wage itself is deemed incommensurate with the work. We see as much in the preceding example.
In the speci c case of decommodi ed labor, the status of the commodity is preserved, but its circulation is halted and its possibility for its exchange is foreclosed. The duration of that foreclosure varies, as does its object. Sometimes the appearance of decommodi ed labor may be periodized historically by population. Child labor, for example, has been decommodi ed in most capitalist democracies for some time. It was for centuries an important source of both waged and unwaged labor. In the United States, since 1938, it has been illegal, and now very few children in the United States are workers. Yet children still possess the ability to be laborers. Were restrictions on child labor lifted tomorrow, we would again have child workers. Capitalist history is lled with examples of work-like actions as they drift in and out of commodi ed states. People themselves also drift in and out of commodi ed states in their speci c role as workers. Actions may become commodi ed; they may likewise be decommodifed. Often when that happens, however, we cease to consider the task work; likewise, we cease calling those undertaking the task workers. Decommodi ed labor forces us to do otherwise.
These three brief examples that I have offered to introduce the concept show something of the breadth and diversity of both decommodi cation and its speci city when applied to labor. In the example of the securities, their decommodi cation interrupted their ability to circulate as a commodity in order to preserve their value and allow them to be reintroduced into a market at some future point. With the decommodi cation of children's labor, a population's ability to labor was suspended with the knowledge that those who occupy that class of laborers would themselves be elongated into a future in 27 28 29 30 which they would join the working world on new terms; the "teenager, " a quasi-adult capable of working but not voting, was a creation of this moment. And, nally, with the "volunteer adjunct" position, because the employer knows that there is no present or future market for academic labor, the employer can make a claim on decommodi ed labor now: work for us for free today, as tomorrow even the chance to work for free might prove elusive. As such, if the concept of class were to be invoked, it would need to be understood as eeting and transient; we simply cannot compare the emergence and recession of decommodi ed laborers to a process of proletarianization.
Periodizing Decommodi ed Labor?
Following Jameson and Zizek, we now claim with some truth that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. In the feudal era, of course, it was easier to imagine the end of the world than the beginning of capitalism. The substitution instructs us that as capitalism develops, it becomes history. When Marx declares that "all history is the history of class struggle" he makes an argument that after the arrival of capitalism, history itself cannot be imagined outside of its frame. This claim would be better said were it to distinguish narrative from history. All history is not the history of As a mode of production, capitalism excels at producing narratives of critical change.
Think of Walter Benjamin's wonderful comment that "there has never been an epoch . . .
[that] did not believe itself to be standing directly before an abyss. " And yet, certain structural features of capitalism do not change. Capital extracts surplus value through the absorption and recreation of workers' time-that constant cannot and will not change.
And workers must be given something in exchange for their time. Workers may work more or less; they may work in elds or factories; they may be unionized or not; they may capture a greater or lesser percentage of the total surplus; they may have expanded or contracted add-ons such as health insurance, retirement, and so on. As with the work itself, the manner in which workers are compensated for the basic appropriation will be historically speci c. The question in attempting to periodize the capital/labor relationship becomes on what terms do we analyze that speci city?
We might see one model in how scholars have used technology to periodize labor. Let us take the example of "digital labor, " as theorized by Christian Fuchs in an impressive body of scholarship. Why do we need a theory of digital labor? Probably because few will deny that computerization, information technology in particular, has transformed the speed with which we communicate, produce and consume on a global scale. digitally across such broad swaths of geography and varying levels of capitalist development? What unites these diversities in order to constitute digital labor?
We know whatever substance is perceived as the essence of digital labor must exceed what media companies have come to call "content, " that undifferentiated mass of commodi ed narratives and affects that we often ourselves produce; it must instead trespass upon, as Marx says of critique in an industrial age, "the door of production. "
Fuchs clari es that digital labor "therefore does not only denote the production of digital content. It is a category that rather encompasses the whole mode of digital production, a network of agricultural, industrial and informational labor that enables the existence and use of digital media. " Digital products require multiple sites and organizations of labor.
And because digital production is so diverse, so must be its manner of compensation, or lack thereof. In a different article, but one that follows the global scope presented here, Fuchs notes that, "most digital relations of production are shaped by wage labor, slave labor, unpaid labor, precarious labor and freelance labor. " Examining a broad range of digital laborers, Fuchs concludes that they are interconnected as workers because "they are all alienated in the sense that they do not own the products they produce. "
What then ultimately distinguishes "digital labor?" Fuchs is hard pressed to say. How is it different from industrial labor? From agricultural labor? The manipulated objects are different, thus, the products produced are different. But it is unclear how that difference changes the basic form of labor itself. I would suggest digital labor is not a type of labor, but rather a manner of periodizing labor. I make a similar argument about affective labor in my forthcoming book, Wages Against Artwork: Socially Engaged Art and the Decommodi cation of Labor. To Fuchs's credit, and unlike much biopolitical discourse, digital labor does maintain certain crucial aspects of labor as theorized by Marx. Namely, that labor partakes in a form of unequal exchange during which some aspect of the worker's time will be appropriated as surplus value from the worker who will then need to compensate for that extraction by regenerating herself to be able to return to work. Yet to emphasize a historical break into a scene of digital (or immaterial labor or cognitive labor) is to proceed backwards, as it were. Assuming that there has been a change to labor's structure, such theories then locate a proximal, often technological, and usually experience-based quali cation of labor. We live in an age of computing, therefore labor has become digital. We live in an age of service provisions, therefore labor has become affective. We live in an age of the separation of mental and manual labor, therefore labor has become cognitive. And so on.
The model for such claims follows the kind of segmentation found in the history of technology: the age of industry, the networked age, the space age, etc. The objects that are selected to bookend such histories are themselves often problematic, as David Edgarton has shown in his wonderfully titled book, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900. Why do we have "the space age" and not the "rickshaw age?"
How did "the age of revolution" cede into "the age of industry?" We may locate other problems, too. Foremost, technology is labor. It is appropriated, socialized, and sedimented labor time-one aspect of "constant capital. " Once that collection becomes "technology" it takes on worrisomely reifying characteristics of which the argument in Heidegger's essay, "The Question Concerning Technology, " may be understood as a symptom. An understanding of technology as labor reveals one of the reasons that exacting a technology-based quali cation of labor is so trying: there's a certain structural redundancy built in. Most simply, we must locate a level of abstraction other than technology to ground our periodization. Indeed, we must ask which aspects of labor should be periodized. of "the factory" emerged. Originally a concept Marx himself used to describe large-scale industrialization and mechanization, "real subsumption" has become somewhat of a metaphor for the ability of capitalism to progress, to intensify, to extract more and to encompass all. There is no "outside, " here; capital has no other. Marx was more precise. He distinguishes formal and real subsumption as based on a move from relative to absolute surplus value. In a regime of absolute surplus value extraction, the working day can be extended to increase pro t. But that increase has an end, obviously, and after its limit has been reached, a regime of relative surplus value extraction takes over. There, labor may be intensi ed through processes internal to capitalism.
For some interpreters, real subsumption is a historical category: rst formal, then real. For others, it is a logical category: these two models of capitalist appropriation are always available and shift back and forth. I am partial to the latter claim. Regardless, with the real 44 45 46 47 subsumption of labor to capital, value extraction is hardly limited to waged work or nancial schemes, and the subjects who might transform our social structures far exceed those found in unions, syndicates and so on. Labor, the value-generating result of the sale of human labor power as a commodity, is understood through the interpretation of real subsumption to have expanded and to refer to a whole host of human activities outside of formal places of work. As Jason Read explains in his wonderful reading of Negri, "capital no longer simply exploits labor, understood as the physical capacity to transform objects, but puts to work the capacities to create and communicate that traverse social relations . . . with real subsumption . . . there is no relationship that cannot be transformed into a commodity. " Mario Tronti goes further: "the social character of production has been extended to the point that the entire society now functions as a mode of production. "
And nally, of course, we note Silvia Federici, Leopoldina Fortunati, and Mariarosa Dalla Costa. Each of these theorists has argued not only that capital seeks recourse to the informality of wagelessness for its reproduction, but that its sites for doing so, i.e., the home, are foundational to capital's continuation.
One the one hand, we can't stop working. All actions seem always-already incorporated If there is no relationship that cannot be transformed into a commodity, then we must add that there is no relationship that cannot be decommodi ed. Decommodi ed labor introduces the notion of an accumulative pause and retreat (for the worker, of course) that terms like spatial x and uneven development seek to locate at a larger scale of analysis. Decommodi ed labor returns us to the discreteness and formality of bounded employment, now with the bene t of theorizations including Negri's and Federici's as a guide. It carves out of the porousness of real subsumption a new site of difference, and it reincorporates that difference into formal work to produce a kind of combined and uneven employment.
Combined and Uneven Employment: Locating
Decommodi ed Labor Now In addition to theorizing decommodi ed labor, to periodizing it, we must be able to locate it. Here we are not concerned with simple wagelessness. Rather we are concerned to identify the location of formal, value-generating work that is not waged. With decommodi ed labor: the work is still the work, the job is still the job, the rules still apply, but the wage has disappeared. Cuba still uses the phrase "volunteer labor" to refer to civic and community tasks that are encouraged and indeed necessary but nonetheless carried out beyond the limits of formal employment and compensation. In the United States, however, we have different idioms to choose from: volunteerism, community service, internship, even "research. " Each resonates with, and indeed exempli es, some crucial element of decommodi ed labor. Benanav rightly notes that "while it is easy to identify the middle or lower levels of the set of surplus workers, it much more dif cult to identify its upper levels. " One reason for such dif culty, as George Caffentzis has suggested, is that "unwaged work [offers] the appearance of personal choice. "
We might delineate four discrete areas in which decommodi ed labor appears today: the culture industry, civic organization, internships, and education, including the academy. It is important to my argument that these identi cations of decommodi ed labor are not organized around a technology. Indeed, we see varying degrees of the use of technology in the examples I will present, but none of them rely on technology for their de nition.
Likewise, none of them rely on "affect" as an over-determining feature. Of course each of them make use of forms of technology and affect-as does all labor; that is quite simply what it means for labor to be, in Marx's words, "uniquely human. " These examples are not meant to be exhaustive. I hope to begin rather than end a conversation.
The Culture Industry
Inherited from the Frankfurt School, the conglomerate notion of "the culture industry" is indeed a capacious concept, ranging from professional sports to music, from art production to lm and television, to now, of course, to the world of social media. What each of these speci c cultural forms has in common is a structural underpinning of decommodifed labor; I will focus only on a few. Sometimes that underpinning is thematized in the cultural form itself: think of reality television, which both dramatizes and is produced by decommodi ed labor. The communications scholar Tanner Mirrlees notes that: "reality TV companies keep production costs to a minimum by exploiting the non-waged labour of anybody who want . . . to become a reality TV celebrity. For most of TV's history, TV studios hired and paid for the labor of professional actors, many of which were unionized . . . [lack of wages] decreases the number of paid jobs for TV. " Likewise, Mark Andrejevic has argued that such television essentially produces a site of spectral labor, what he calls "the work of being watched, " in his book of the same name. What I would add to this communications-based overview is that the viewing public enjoys watching unpaid people as they struggle to nd remuneration after the wage because it mirrors their own experiences. Indeed, reality television-everyone working, no one really working-both resonates with and renders normative the decommodi ed working life of many.
Other times, however, the decommodi ed labor that subtends the cultural form is 
toiling long hours and seeing very little, if any, actual golf. " These volunteer activities are regulated. One has to purchase a uniform; show up on time; follow the rules and so on.
What happens if one is late or missing one's uniform or watching golf instead of doing laundry? According to one professional tennis tournament-proudly run almost exclusively through volunteers-failure to follow the rules will result in "termination. "
This, then, is a relationship of employer to employee.
Civic Work
In the mid-1970s, at the height of New York City's scal crisis, with hospitals slated to close, police of cers and re ghters being laid off by the thousands, and no help forthcoming from the Federal Government, the city came up with a novel idea: get people to work in government jobs without pay. Senator Jacob Javits initiated the Citizens Committee for New York City in hopes of "recruiting 10,000 volunteers to staff public 
Universities
Readers of Lateral will be unsurprised to see this category: from uncompensated student work, to uncompensated peer-faculty work (editing, reviewing, publishing, particularly for adjuncts and others not on salary), to the turning over of such documents as dissertations tax and so on. The proliferation of decommodi ed labor suggests not simply an evacuation of the personal wage, but of the social wage as well.
Prisons
Prisons represent an ambiguous category for the location of decommodifed labor. Labor, as we know, is "free" labor and within labor's illusory freedom various sites of constraint circumscribe the life of the worker. In prison, however, inmates are often forced to work without pay. At that point, we are no longer speaking of decommodi ed labor because we are out of the realm of labor per se. Indeed, in such a case we might better speak of indentured servitude or forms of neo-capitalist slavery, as many scholars have argued.
That does not mean such labor is not part of capitalism, or that it is not productive; we need not return to those debates of the 1960s and 70s about whether slavery was capitalistic. Instead, we should note that the wage renders the non-wage productive, and vice versa. As Marx himself says: "Capital . . . is not only . . . the command over labour.
It is essentially the command over unpaid labour. " He consequently af rms that "the secret of the self-expansion of capital resolves itself into having the disposal of a de nite quantity of other people's unpaid labour. " Indeed, the expansion of prison as a reactionary racist force throughout the 1970s and 80s, as Jordan Camp has argued, is part of the same crisis of the Keynesian state as is the decommodi ed labor I have attempted to de ne throughout this article. But prison labor denotes an interstice in which labor cedes into something else; it represents the limit of the wage. In a similar limit case, The Washington Post notes that in majority white populations throughout the US south, many are paid not to work through disability schemes. "Between 1996 and 2015, the number of working-age adults receiving disability climbed from 7.7 million to 13 million. The federal government [spends more on disability payments] than the combined total for food stamps, welfare, housing subsidies and unemployment assistance. " Finally, the Post highlights the racial character of disability payments by specifying such payments as "a force that has reshaped scores of mostly white, almost exclusively rural communities, where as many as one-third of working-age adults live on monthly disability checks. " As with not getting paid, or getting paid a pittance, for prison work, getting paid for "disability" represents the limits of the wage form and not necessarily a site for the identi cation of decommodi ed labor. Thus, I disagree with Peter Frase who suggests that "insofar as there are programs like unemployment protection, socialized medicine, and guaranteed income security in retirement-and insofar as eligibility for these programs is close to universal-we can say that labor has been partially de-commodi ed. " What, nally, does this section of my article offer examples of? As a regime of relative surplus value and real subsumption is established, labor becomes a ghostly repetition of itself. In these examples, we see the local and proximal form such labor takes. The appropriate and necessary term for this state of affairs is decommodi ed labor. Using his own distinction between wealth and value, Moishe Postone concludes Time, Labor and Social Domination with this remarkable claim: "As capitalist industrial production . . . Why is decommodi ed labor something in need of new conceptual differentiation? Why is it not a reapplication of the kind of care work and other feminized and racialized forms of devalued labor on which capitalism has long-like, always-depended? Or does decommoodi ed labor have at its root the kind of potentially metaphorical reach that "real subsumption" has turned out to have? Could we understand it in a spatial language of inside/outside, a kind of Deleuzian fold in the eld of the wage? These questions seem to me to offer some real criticisms of my argument.
In response, I would suggest that decommodi ed labor might help us specify and better understand how aspects of care work and housework have been absorbed and recon gured in formal employment. Indeed, decommodi ed labor may help us to recognize how regimes of surplus value accumulation are re ected in the basic sale of the labor commodity itself. I would further proffer that keeping the question of labor within the realm of the commodity form provides surer theoretical footing on which to stand when attempting to make a claim on labor's present than does appealing to technologyitself a form of socialized labor. Such technology-based periodizing might alert us to labor's discourses or to workers' experience of labor, but it will not lead us to an understanding of labor's structural relationship to capital. Indeed, it might obfuscate that relationship through the very language of novelty and transformation that has been a fundamental accompaniment to modern discourses on technology.
In surveying capitalism's history, we can see that it has always relied on decommodi ed labor to pace, interrupt, disorganize and render pro table commodi ed labor. Much as it has always relied on deskilling. And deindustrialization. Value as a social process necessarily contains within it the possibility of devaluation. I have tried to delimit a moment in which this process becomes perceptible within labor. By placing that process within formal places of work, I have tried to show how truly expansive it may become.
Decommodi ed labor is not new, but then, neither is affect, neither is mentality, neither is cognition. Indeed, "digitality" itself is now being theorized "without computers" perhaps a precursor to showing its longue durée as well.
Notes

